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ABSTRACT
The challenges encountered in modern power system operations have in-
creased as electricity grids have become more geographically widespread and
complex. Some modern bulk grids now combine AC and DC subsystems to
effectively serve their loads. Communications and controls for such combined
grids, in particular, have increasingly become more challenging. System dis-
turbances in such combined grids have the potential to cascade and affect
much larger portions of the grid. These challenges have only been exacer-
bated by the deepening penetrations of renewable energy resources, such as
wind and solar. A key operational concern of such combined grids is the
ability of the system operators to continually maintain situational awareness
in their operations. The response times within which corrective control ac-
tions must be dispatched under contingencies have shortened considerably.
In an attempt to ensure the intact transmission of an ever larger amount of
information for combined AC-DC grids so as to maintain situational aware-
ness and promptly dispatch control actions, the electric power industry has
increased the deployment of cyberphysical, microprocessor-based devices in
system monitoring and control. These devices provide system operational
information to the system operator over digital channels with latencies much
lower than those using conventional copper wire analog signals. But, with
this more intense reliance in power system monitoring and control on com-
munication channels, cybersecurity has become an additional concern. The
possibility that entities/individuals with malicious intent can gain access to
these communication channels and are able to alter operational commands
is a fact of life. The types of cyber attacks that threat agents can per-
form are varied and include false data injection and data integrity attacks,
spoofing and denial of service. While it is advisable to include information-
technology-based intrusion detection/prevention techniques to parse and ver-
ify the syntax of protocol messages, effective use of the physical characteris-
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tics of the power grid provides alternative, physics-based detection methods.
So far, physics-based detection methods have mostly focused on AC system
applications. Some investigations have been conducted on combined AC-DC
systems, which have focused primarily on microgrids so as to restrict the
applications to low- and medium-voltage systems.
In this report, we propose and investigate a physics-based approach to
threat detection in bulk combined AC-DC grids via the use of a rapid, ap-
proximate state estimation scheme. We specifically investigate data integrity
attacks, which aim to corrupt the active power dispatch commands on the
HVDC lines in these combined bulk AC-DC grids. The state-estimation-
based scheme we propose requires the determination of the system state
estimates at sufficiently frequent time intervals to allow the performance of
consistency checks between the approximate injections computed from the
estimate of the state with respect to that of the power flow that corresponds
to the true power order transmitted for implementation. We obtain gains
in computational speed in the proposed approximate state-estimation-based
approach to make it capable to track the changes in state with adequate
accuracy for detection purposes. For this purpose, we use the power transfer
distribution factors (PTDFs) as the criterion for measurement prioritization
to produce a reduced subset of prioritized measurement. In addition, we
impose a judiciously specified limit on the number of iterations in the state
estimation to meet the time response requirements. These two modifica-
tions, combined with effectively implemented sparsity-techniques, result in a
robust approach for the detection of the class of cyber threats considered in
this report.
The contribution of this report lies in the use of the widely used power
system state estimation tool to develop a simple, practical physics-based ap-
proach to data integrity attack detection specifically for use in combined bulk
AC-DC grids. We advantageously use the incorporation of this PTDF-based
measurement prioritization feature into the conventional AC state estimation
extensively deployed in modern EMSs to create a detection scheme for the
cyber threats considered in this report.
We demonstrate the effective deployment of this state-estimation-based
approach with results from case studies on a representative 2470-bus syn-
thetic combined AC-DC test system that is based on the U.S. part of the
WECC interconnection with the California-Oregon Pacific DC intertie. In
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our simulation studies, we are able to detect the corruption of a 920 MW
power order command to within 5 % of its true value. The implementation
of this corrupted power order is detected within a 30-second time period with
the prioritized measurement subset to contain the measurements associated
with less than 2 % of the total number of lines in the system.
The results discussed have provided insights into the performance of the
heuristic procedures and a basis for the appropriate choices of the tunable
parameters of the state estimation scheme. We discuss the computational
and accuracy aspects and provide bounds on the extent to which an attacker
can corrupt power orders that the scheme successfully detects. We observe,
for instance, that the accuracy of the approach is more sensitive to our choice
of the prioritized measurements than the limit on the number of iterations.
We also share our insights on the deployment aspects of this approach by a
system operator of a physical combined AC-DC bulk power grid.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we set the stage for the work that is presented in this re-
port. Our research investigation is devoted to the development of a fast,
approximate state-estimation-based method to detect data integrity attacks
in combined AC-DC bulk power systems. We begin our discussion with a
description of the way operational challenges in modern combined AC-DC
bulk grids are being addressed through the adoption of appropriate cyber-
physical components. We also discuss the security concerns that stem from
their adoption due to the potential of cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabil-
ities in the communication channels. We start out with an overview of the
background in this area to provide an understanding and appreciation for
the nature of the problem considered. We discuss the scope and nature of
the contributions of our work and the range of applications that they can
address. We devote a section to provide an outline of the material in the
remaining sections of this report.
1.1 Cybersecurity in the modern bulk power system
The electric power system as we know it today has existed for more than 140
years, having come a long way from the highly local systems first installed in
cities such as New York and San Francisco in the late 19th century. The elec-
tric power industry has grown considerably since then, and power networks
today are more geographically widespread and highly complex. There are
many modern bulk power systems that combine AC and DC subsystems to
serve their loads. HVAC technology is widely used in bulk transmission due
to the ease of transformation of voltages so as to transmit power over long
distances with minimal losses. The considerable advances in HVDC technol-
ogy have also led to the deployment of HVDC grids to connect asynchronous
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power networks together or to connect specific parts of a system without any
compromise in the overall system stability [1]. Communication and controls
for these combined networks have become a significant challenge, exacerbated
further by the deepening penetrations of renewable energy resources. Sys-
tem disturbances in one part of the network may no longer remain localized
and have the potential to cascade rapidly and affect much larger portions of
the power grid. A key operational concern is the ability to maintain intact
the transmission of ever larger amounts of information from all over such
combined networks to ensure continual situational awareness with low la-
tency around the clock. Moreover, the time frames within which corrective
actions need to be dispatched under contingencies have shrunk considerably.
The electric power industry has increasingly incorporated newer technologies
to make fast communication and control possible. In this regard, the most
crucial technological upgrade is, arguably, the addition of a cyberphysical
layer in the physical power system [2]. The advent of reliable semiconductor-
based technologies have led to an explosion of microprocessor devices that are
widely deployed in power systems. Such devices can transmit measurements
and control information between one another as well as to a centralized op-
erations control center over digital communication channels at much lower
latencies than conventional copper wire analog channels. Microprocessor-
based devices such as digital protective relays and phasor data concentrators
also have the computational capabilities to autonomously initiate control ac-
tions with response times that are impossible for human operators. While
their increased adoption has reduced response times for corrective actions in
the event of contingency events, the presence of microprocessor-based devices
has opened up a new class of security issues for the bulk power grid in terms
of cybersecurity vulnerabilities [3]. Published literature has recognized that
unsecured or insufficiently secured implementations of cyberphysical devices
and digital communication channels result in the greater vulnerability to cy-
ber attacks of the electric grid [4]. Government entities have recognized the
cybersecurity challenges of such potential vulnerabilities. For instance, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in June 2019, issued a new
standard to expand the reporting requirements for incidents that involve at-
tempts to compromise grid operations [5]. Significant research efforts have
been devoted to classify the various types of cyber threats and their impacts
on secure operation of power grids. Examples of such threats include denial-
2
of-service (DoS) attacks, GPS clock synchronization attacks for PMUs, replay
attacks, false data injection attacks and data integrity attacks. In addition,
considerable research efforts have also been dedicated to understand the vari-
ous techniques and pathways through which threat agents execute these types
of attacks so as to deliberately modify the intended power system operations.
False data injection and data integrity attacks are two widely studied types
of cybersecurity threats. In such attacks, entities gain access to the commu-
nication channels and modify the data contents of transmitted signals. False
data injection attacks are directed at system measurements and are discussed
in [6]. Such attacks take advantage of the inherent noise present in measure-
ments and the specified tolerance of the energy management system (EMS)
data acquisition stage to such noise. False data injection is, typically, em-
ployed with the objective to “hoodwink” a system operator into the creation
of an association with the system state corrupted values that differ from the
true state of the physical system. The motivation for the launch of such at-
tacks ranges from the desire to compromise an element of the critical energy
infrastructure to the gain of financial benefits [7]. For example, [8] describes a
type of false data injection attack where attackers manipulate ramping limits
of generators to make profits through financial arbitrage in power markets
via the deployment of look-ahead dispatch. Data integrity attacks can be
employed in conjunction with false-data injection attacks to target control
command signals that are transmitted through communication protocols [9],
[10]. To mitigate the threats of these attacks, information-technology (IT)
based cybersecurity threat intrusion and detection techniques have been in-
vestigated extensively [11], [12], [13]. These techniques examine the signa-
tures of the incoming communication signals to identify and detect anomalies.
While many such methods are advisable and recommended, it is possible to
avoid detection by them by the construction of syntactically correct attack
strategies. In such cases, the in-depth knowledge of the system topology of
a system operator may lead to alternate methods using physics-based threat
detection approaches [14], [15], [16].
The review of the existing body of literature on cybersecurity in power
systems indicates that the majority of the physics-based cyber threat detec-
tion methods focus on AC-only systems [14], [17], [18]. A graph-theoretic
approach using PMU measurements for threat detection has been proposed
and investigated in [15]. The authors in [14] present a topology perturbation-
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based defense method for threat detection that relies on probing the system
using pre-determined perturbations, introduced in a structured manner. The
use of state estimation in power system cybersecurity has also been inves-
tigated [19], [20], [21]. Cyberphysical security assessment using state esti-
mation to detect a compromised RTU under an N-1 contingency scenario is
presented in [22]. A bi-level state estimator that uses supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) and wide area measurement system (WAMS) for
cyberphysical system security is presented in [19]. In [21], a robust state esti-
mator against cyber attacks is proposed. A state-estimation-based approach
that utilizes a Markov chain-based model of the power system using historical
data from a set of trusted buses is presented in [20]. The state-estimation-
based detection methods described in [19], [20] as well as many other papers
focus primarily on false data injection threats directed at system measure-
ments, and are specific to AC grids. Published literature on threat analysis
and detection methods for DC systems is relatively small [23], [24], [25]. The
impacts of data integrity attacks on control commands in microgrids has
been analyzed in [10]. Certain investigations on the detection of false data
injection attacks for DC microgrids are presented in [24]. Other potential
security measures to DoS mitigation efforts have been proposed in [25]. As
these studies are all focused on microgrids, the proposed detection strategies
have mostly been limited to low- and medium-voltage systems. The lack of
techniques for combined AC-DC transmission grids is the motivation for the
work presented in this report. The contribution of this report lies in the use
of a well-established power system operations tool – state estimation – to
develop a simple, physics-based approach to data integrity attack detection
specifically for use in combined bulk AC-DC grids. The scope and nature
of the work, the proposed approach to modeling and the steps we propose
so as to make state estimation computation computationally tractable under
limited time budgets for low latency detection are elaborated in the next sec-
tion. We present the capabilities of the approach and also describe various
applications to combined AC-DC grids.
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1.2 Nature and scope of the report
In this report, we focus on data integrity attacks in bulk AC-DC grids. The
specific data integrity attack we focus on is the one that aims to corrupt
the power order dispatch command that determines the active power flow
on the HVDC line in such a grid. To help the reader understand the nature
of the attack threat and its possible implementation, we describe briefly
the operational circumstances and mechanics through which such an attack
may be realized using a possible scenario. In many combined bulk AC-
DC grids, HVDC lines are used to transfer large blocks of power from one
region of the grid to another during times of high demand. The converter
equipment associated with the sending and receiving end of such HVDC
lines allow the active power flows on the lines to be precisely controlled. In
system operations, the active power flows on the lines are determined via
optimization tools, such as optimal power flow (OPF) and which are widely
used in large-scale interconnections. The OPF output generates a power
order command for this assigned active power flow, which is transmitted
from the operations control center over a communication channel to both
the sending and the receiving end converter control stations. This power
order command is then implemented by the local operators at these converter
stations. Under this operational scenario, a cyber attacker can intercept
and alter the power order command, once access is gained by the attacker
to the communications channel that transmits the power order, in a way
that successfully manages to be undetected by the message protocol syntax
checks. This type of power order command corruption cannot be detected
by IT-based detection strategies. Each local control center operator receives
the corrupted power order and implements it. The implementation of such a
corrupted power order command may have deleterious effects on the grid that
result from the deviations in system operating frequency that lead to changes
in the outputs of the generators that participate in the provision of frequency
response. Such an attack on the power order may also be further exacerbated
by false data injection attacks in the form of spoofed measurements from
the HVDC stations so as to make the whole HVDC subsystem information
untrustworthy. Such a cyber threat is challenging to detect. This is the threat
scenario that we focus on in our development of a physics-based detection
strategy.
5
We present a state-estimation-based approach to detect such data integrity
attacks. The approach relies on the tracking of the physical system’s behav-
ior over a specified period and the performance of consistency checks based
on the differences between the power injections computed from the state esti-
mates output of the state estimation procedure and the injections associated
with the true power order command. As low latency is a crucial aspect for a
detection approach to be considered practical, we introduce certain approxi-
mation techniques in the state estimation scheme to make it computationally
tractable within the limited time budgets to allow the tracking to have high
fidelity. Before we describe the details of the approach, we first lay out the
underlying assumptions we use in the work described in this report. The
first assumption stems from our attack description wherein measurement
data obtained from the HVDC system are not considered to be trustworthy.
We assume that while the HVDC measurements have been compromised,
either by a corrupted power order transmitted or by false data injection, the
measurements from the larger AC system are not subject to attack. The sec-
ond assumption we make is that the network topology remains fixed during
the time period over which the power order is implemented. The third as-
sumption is that at every point in time at which measurements are sampled,
the system is in a quasi-static state, as there are no disturbances to result in
power system dynamic response.
We make detailed use of these assumptions in the construction of the pro-
posed detection approach. The first assumption permits us to use a modified
injection-based model to represent the interactions between the AC and the
DC subsystems in the combined AC-DC grid. This modified model captures
the interactions of the DC subsystem with the AC subsystem through an
ordered sequence of snapshots of active power injections at the AC interface
buses connected to the HVDC subsystem. In this way, we view the HVDC
subsystem as external to the modified model with the result that the state
estimate computation is no longer affected by the compromised HVDC mea-
surement data transmitted. The injections at the AC interface buses in this
model represent the active power flow on the HVDC line, which are compared
to the injections associated with the true power order command. As state
estimation is an iterative procedure, we ensure its computational tractability
under the limited time budgets by the prioritization of a small subset of the
large number of available system measurements received in real time. We
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consider the active and reactive power line flow measurements in the system,
and use the power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) as the basis for mea-
surement prioritization. We construct the subset of the measurements in real
time from those lines whose magnitudes are above a specified threshold value
to reduce the number of the measurements used by the SE procedure. To
maintain the overdetermined nature of the state estimation problem, we sup-
plement this subset of real-time measurements with pseudo-measurements.
The resultant computational speed of the proposed approach allows us to
track the system state in sub-minute intervals, compared to the typical 2-5
minute time period in actual system operations [26].
We provide representative numerical results obtained from simulation stud-
ies to investigate the capabilities of the approach to detect a corrupted power
order command for a particular combined AC-DC test system. The test sys-
tem we use is the 2,470-bus synthetic representation of the U.S. part of the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). The DC subsystem we
model in this synthetic test system is an HVDC line that represents the 500
kV Pacific DC intertie with a rated capacity of 6,200 A between Oregon and
California. The insights gained from the application of the approach to this
synthetic test system are used to illustrate how the judicious choice of the
PTDF magnitude threshold and the specified maximum number of iterations
may be effectively made in the application of this approach to other systems.
The results of our simulation studies for this test system show that we are
able to detect the corruption of a power order command to within 50 MW of
its true value. The implementation of the corrupted power order is detected
within a time period of 30 seconds by prioritizing measurements from just
56 of the nearly 5,400 lines in the test system. The results illustrate that the
judicious choice of these parameters allows the approach to bound the ex-
tent to which an attacker can compromise a power order command without
detection. The discussion of the analyzed results sheds light on the bene-
ficial impacts of the modifications to parts of the communication network.
Specifically, from an implementation standpoint, the upgrade of the com-
munication channels for prioritized lines provides the system operator with
effective means to closely track the system state over time with an enhanced
level of trustworthiness. The performance of the approach on a wide range
of sensitivity studies provides the basis to conclude that the approach works
effectively on large-scale grids and the parameters may be tuned to other
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large grids to detect data integrity threats with acceptably rapid response
times. Moreover, the approach presented is general in the sense that it can
be adapted for use in combined AC-DC bulk grids that include multiple
HVDC lines. One of the significant aspects of our approach lies in its ability
to provide answers to a broad spectrum of “what if” questions regarding
response times and tolerances. The work represents an advancement of the
state of the art in data integrity attack detection of power order commands
as it presents a comprehensive approach that is general, relatively easy to
implement, and illustrates the trade-offs in detection latency with the choice
of tunable parameters.
1.3 Overview of the report
We devote this section to outline the contents of the chapters that make up
the rest of this report. In chapter 2, we present the development and current
state of static, steady-state analysis and solution methods for power flow and
state estimation for AC as well as combined AC-DC systems. We describe
the power flow equations, the principal methods for the solution of power flow
problems in AC systems and their extensions for use in the combined AC-
DC grids. We discuss the formulation of an alternate model formulation for
these combined systems, in which we incorporate the impacts of the DC state
variables via the modification of the power injections/withdrawals at the AC
buses at which the DC subsystem is interconnected. This injection-based AC
model allows the analysis of the cybersecurity threat detection based on the
approximation of the injections at the interface buses between the two sub-
systems. We then discuss the salient features of the state-estimation-based
approach that make threat detection feasible with low latency. These include
prioritization of a smaller subset of measurements and a specified limit on
the number of iterations in the state estimation. We describe the criterion we
propose for measurement prioritization and its characteristics. We also dis-
cuss the process through which we supplement the real-time measurements
with additional pseudo-measurements for the procedure.
In chapter 3, we discuss the implementation aspects of the proposed ap-
proach. We study the performance of the proposed approach via extensive
simulation of various threat attack scenarios in such as way as to answer a
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broad range of “what if” questions. We discuss the setup of the simulation
of a realistic combined AC-DC power system as well as the issues in the
collection and the transmission over the communication network of system
measurements to the EMS. We provide some insights into the computational
aspects of the implemented state estimation approach and on the advanta-
geous exploitation of sparsity to improve computational tractability.
We devote chapter 4 to present representative numerical results and the
insights that we obtain on the effectiveness of the approach in the threat de-
tection. We illustrate the effective deployment of the state-estimation-based
approach in a case study with data integrity attacks on power commands on
the high-voltage direct current (HVDC) line integrated within an AC grid.
We discuss the computational and accuracy aspects and provide bounds on
the extent to which an attacker can corrupt power orders that the scheme is
able to successfully detect. The thrust of the chapter is to illustrate that the
procedure to determine the judicious choice of PTDF magnitude threshold
and maximum iterations is heuristic and specific to the system under consid-
eration. We discuss insights on the appropriate selection of the PTDF mag-
nitude threshold and maximum iterations and the ramifications that these
have from an implementation standpoint.
Chapter 5 provides a short summary of the contributions of the report and
a discussion on directions for future investigations. The future investigations
may focus on the relaxation of some of the assumptions used in the report.
Sensitivity studies of the performance of the detection approach to changes
in network topology, the incorporation of bad data detection in the AC state
estimation, and the use of probabilistic anomaly detection methods to detect
threats are topics for future work.
This report also contains two appendices. Appendix A presents the math-
ematical formulation of the nonlinear AC state estimation as a weighted-
least-squares optimization problem. The detailed derivation of the iterative
scheme for the computation of the state estimate is provided for the con-
venience of the reader. Appendix B describes the details of the synthetic
WECC test system that we utilize for the work done in this report. We
discuss the salient features of the system and describe modifications that we
made to the test system specifically for this study.
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1.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the motivations behind the work that is
presented in this report and our focus on the cybersecurity issues in com-
bined AC-DC grids. We also stressed the salient aspects of such grids and the
context of the cybersecurity investigations given the increasing deployment
of microprocessor-based devices to continually maintain situational aware-
ness. Specifically, we emphasized that unsecured or insufficiently secured
deployment of these devices open up vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
cyber attackers to alter power system operations. While existing measures of
IT-based intrusion detection and prevention are currently used to mitigate
cybersecurity threats, we described how the detection of syntactically correct
attack messages can fail despite such measures. We presented a class of real-
istic threat scenarios whose detection may be effectively performed through
the application of the proposed approach. The review of the state of the art
in physics-based methods of threat detection indicates the rationale for the
work described. We presented our approach to the detection of data integrity
attacks directed at power order commands in combined AC-DC bulk grids
through the use of state estimation. We described the salient features of this
state-estimation-based approach and described how the judicious selection
of the appropriate choice of tunable parameters in this approach provides a
basis for its application to other systems. We also gave a short summary of
the rest of the report.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this chapter, we review the development and current state of solution
methods for power flow and state estimation of combined AC-DC systems.
We first review the solution methods developed for the solution schemes of
the power flow and state estimation problem for AC power systems and then
discuss the extension to combined AC-DC systems. We identify the com-
plexities involved in the solution methods when applied to combined AC-DC
systems. We utilize an alternate model formulation that captures the interac-
tion between the DC subsystem and AC subsystem in terms of a sequence of
snapshots of active power injections and withdrawals. In this way, we make
use of a purely AC model to represent the combined AC-DC systems. We
also discuss the characteristics of the class of cybersecurity threats that are
considered in this report. We discuss how the modified injection AC model
allows us to analyze the cybersecurity threat detection problem in the context
of state estimation. For state estimation, we carry out a consistency check
between the behavior of the system that corresponds to the control com-
mands sent for implementation with that of the system’s observed behavior.
We list the salient requirement for this approach to be effective to perform
state estimation more frequently than is used in usual power system opera-
tions. We present the computational aspects that the state-estimation-based
approach entails. In particular, we recognize the difficulty in the collection
of a large set of system measurements at more frequent intervals, due to the
limitations of the communication channels, and we propose the use of power
transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) as the metric to prioritize the measure-
ments that we need to receive in real time. We outline the approximation
techniques that are deployed to make the process computationally tractable
under the limited time constraints for its application.
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2.1 A brief review of power flow and state estimation
solution methods for AC and combined AC-DC
grids
The static, steady-state analysis and solution techniques for AC systems have
been extensively investigated with a broad range of solution techniques for
power flow, state estimation and optimal power flow published in the power
systems literature [27], [28], [29], [30]. The basic problem in the analysis and
the operation of an AC power grid is the determination of system voltage
magnitudes and phase angles at each bus of the system for the specified power
generation and consumption data at the bus. Specifically, for a system with
nb buses, comprising ng generator (or PV) buses, nl load (or PQ) buses, and 1
slack bus, the power flow problem seeks to determine the state of the system.
The state of the system is formally defined as the vector which specifies the
nodal voltage magnitude at each PQ bus and the nodal voltage angle at
each bus except the slack bus. In mathematical terms, with the (ng + nl)-
dimensional vector of nodal voltage angles at each bus (except the slack bus)
denoted by θ, and the (nl)-dimensional vector of nodal voltage magnitude at
each PQ bus, denoted by v, we define the (2nl + ng)-dimensional vector of
the system state as
x =
[
θ
v
]
. (2.1)
The power flow problem is inherently nonlinear in nature, as evident from
the power balance equations
pi(x) =
n∑
k=1
vivk(gik cos (θi − θk) + bik sin (θi − θk)) + piG − piD (2.2)
qi(x) =
n∑
k=1
vivk(gik sin (θi − θk)− bik cos (θi − θk)) + qiG − qiD. (2.3)
In the above equations, the functions pi(·) and qi(·) denote the net active
and reactive power injection at bus i. The terms gik and bik denote the real
and imaginary part of the admittance of the line that connects buses i and k.
The terms pi
G and qi
G (pi
D and qi
D) are active and reactive power generation
(demand) at bus i, respectively. By defining the (ng +nl)-dimensional vector
of the active power balance equations for all non-slack buses as p(x), and
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the nl-dimensional vector of the reactive power balance equations for all PQ
buses as q(x), we can compactly write the (2nl+ng)-dimensional power flow
equations as
f(x) =
[
p(x)
q(x)
]
. (2.4)
Mathematically, to solve the power flow problem is to solve the system of
equations
f(x) = 0. (2.5)
Prior to the advent of digital computers, power flow problems were primarily
solved using analog network analyzers [31]. The Newton-Raphson (N-R)
method for the solution of the power flow problem – considered to be the most
widely used approach in power flow solutions – was proposed by James Van
Ness [32] and was subsequently expanded [33]. The method is an iterative
scheme that can be compactly written as follows:
−[∇fx(x(ν))](∆x(ν)) = f(x(ν)) (2.6)
x(ν+1) = x(ν) + ∆x(ν), (2.7)
where [∇fx] denotes the Jacobian matrix of the power flow equations with
respect to the state, and ν is the iteration index. In the context of the power
flow problem, the N-R method is adapted as follows:[
∆p
∆q
]
=
[
H N
J L
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−∇f(x)
[
∆θ
∆v
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆x
. (2.8)
The left side of the equation is often referred to as the residual vector. The
Jacobian matrix ∇fx is a highly sparse matrix with a block structure. The
block sub-matrices H , N , J , and L denote the partial derivatives as shown
below:
H =
∂p(x)
∂θ
N =
∂p(x)
∂v
J =
∂q(x)
∂θ
L =
∂q(x)
∂v
.
(2.9)
Typically, the N-R method requires a considerably reduced number of itera-
tions to converge to a solution compared to the earlier methods used. Major
gains in the scheme’s computational efficiency resulted from Tinney’s use
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of optimally ordered Gaussian elimination [34]. The nature of the strong
coupling between the nodal voltage angles and the net power injections and
that between the voltage nagnitudes and the reactive power was exploited
to approximate the so-called decoupled [35] and fast-decoupled power flow
methods [36] by Stott and Alsac. Further approximations led to the develop-
ment of the DC power flow method [37]. All these schemes are implemented
in commercial power flow solvers and widely used in transmission system
planning and operations. The N-R method has also been applied to the
analysis of combined AC-DC grids, i.e, connected AC and DC subsystems
[38], [39], [40]. We define the DC subsystem, in the context of our discus-
sion, to comprise the HVDC transmission line, the switched-type converter
at each end of the HVDC transmission line, and the converter transformers
through which the converters are connected to the AC buses of the AC grid.
We refer to the AC bus at which active power is injected into the HVDC
line as the sending end, and the AC bus at which active power is withdrawn
from the line as the receiving end. Figure 2.1 is a simplified schematic of a
DC subsystem, as it pertains to the objectives of our study. The extension
Figure 2.1: Simplified block representation of a 2-terminal HVDC
subsystem in an AC system.
of the N-R power flow to combined AC-DC grids requires the addition of
algebraic equations that represents the DC subsystem and its connection to
the AC nodes at the sending and receiving terminals. The specifics of the
DC power flow equations at the interface depend – to some extent – on the
control strategy of the DC subsystem, as detailed in [41]. By defining the set
of additional equations compactly as g(x, y), we can write the power flow
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equations for the combined system as:
fc(x, y) =
[
f(x, y)
g(x, y)
]
. (2.10)
The vector y is the state vector of the DC subsystem whose components
include the converter terminal AC voltage magnitude v and phase angle θ,
the converter transformer AC phase angle φ and the turns ratio a, and the DC
line voltage Ed at each end of the DC subsystem. Additional state variables
include the DC line current Id, the delay angle α and the extinction angle
δ. The delay and extinction angles are variables of the switching elements in
the converters. We define the state vector for the combined AC-DC system
to be
xc =
θv
y
 . (2.11)
Each N-R iteration for the solution of the combined AC-DC system power
flow equations requires the solution of a linear equation of the form:∆p∆q
∆r
 =
H N DJ L E
B C A

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−∇fc(xc)
∆θ∆v
∆y
 .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆xc
(2.12)
Here, ∆r is the residual vector for the nonlinear equations that represent the
DC subsystem power flow and control strategy. The elements of the block
matrices H , N , J , and L have identical values as for the AC subsystem
case, except for the diagonal elements associated with the buses at which the
DC subsystem is connected. The elements of the block sub-matrices B, C,
D, and E are mostly zeros, except for a few elements associated with the
converter AC buses at the receiving and sending ends. The solution process
for the combined AC-DC system model and its complexities are discussed
in [41]. These complexities are due to the subset of the DC state variables
that are independently controlled. The N-R solution method is effectively
adopted in a two-step iterative solution process [42]. In our modeling ap-
proach, we represent the interactions between the DC system and the AC
subsystems through a sequence of snapshots of the active power injections
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and withdrawals at the interconnection AC subsystem buses. In this way, the
N-R scheme requires the solution of the system in (2.8) for each snapshot. In
our modified AC model, we incorporate the impacts of the DC state variables
via the modification of the power injections/withdrawals at the AC buses at
which the DC subsystem is interconnected. Figure 2.2 depicts the representa-
tion of the combined AC-DC system and its representation in our approach.
We may view the modified AC model in our approach as the externaliza-
Figure 2.2: The modified AC model of the combined AC-DC system model
of the physical system for the solution approach of the combined AC-DC
systems.
tion of the DC subsystem via the sequence of modified injection/withdrawal
powers into the buses at which the DC subsystem interconnects with the AC
subsystem. This injection-based modeling approach has been used to model
HVDC subsystems, as well as other types of flexible AC transmission systems
(FACTS) in AC power systems [43].
The development of solution methods for power flow problems for AC sys-
tems was closely followed by the application of state estimation to AC power
systems, pioneered by Schweppe in [44], [45], [46] and extended by others [47].
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The state estimator is a data-processing scheme to compute an estimate of
the static power system state vector xˆ from a set of contemporaneous mea-
surements of variables z together with information of the grid topology and
states, taking into account the uncertainty in the collection of measurements.
The mathematical relationship between the power system state x and the
uncertain measurement vector z of dimension m, with m >> (2nl + ng), is
z = h(x) + e, (2.13)
where h(x) = [h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hm(x)]
> is the m-dimensional vector-valued
function that expresses each measurement as a function of the state, and
the error vector e that represents the noise in each received measurement
due to errors in the meters and the transmission of the measured value data.
The classical solution method of the state estimation problem is a weighted-
least-squares (WLS) optimization of the differences between the transmitted
measurement values and those provided by the state estimate. The mathe-
matical formulation of the static state estimation problem and the solution
method is presented in Appendix A. A salient requirement for state estima-
tion is the need for more measurements than the number of components in
the state vector that are to be estimated. The measurements received from a
system include system voltages, line currents, line active and reactive power
flows, as well as bus active and reactive power injections. In practice, state
estimation for power systems is done on a periodic basis, typically every 2-5
minutes. System state estimation for combined AC-DC power systems has
also been investigated [48]. The injection-based modeling approach for the
simulation of combined AC-DC systems that we adopt to simplify the power
flow problem solution is also useful in the state estimation process in the
consideration of the impacts of the DC measurement errors in the determi-
nation of the combined AC-DC system state. Since the interaction between
the HVDC and AC subsystem is represented as a set of the modification
of the active power injections and withdrawals in the AC subsystem connec-
tion buses, the gross measurement errors received from the HVDC subsystem
cannot affect the computation of system state estimate xˆ under the modified
AC model.
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2.2 State-estimation-based approach for cyber threat
detection
As part of our study of cybersecurity in HVDC subsystems, we focus on the
development of techniques to detect cyber threats directed at power orders
on HVDC subsystems. We characterize such threats as data integrity attack
actions, i.e., deliberate misspecification of the transmitted power orders to
the HVDC converter stations from the system operator’s energy management
system (EMS) for the subsequent implementation of the modified orders in-
stead of the true orders. The operators at the HVDC stations responsible
for the order implementation have no access to system-wide information and
therefore are unable to evaluate the integrity of the received power order
and thus likely to accept it without question. To mask the corruption of a
power order from the EMS, the cyber attack perpetrator may also falsify the
measurements of the DC variables to further reinforce the false impression
that the requested order is indeed correctly implemented. The nature of the
power order threat therefore makes all components of the HVDC subsys-
tem suspect and so HVDC measurements cannot be trusted. However, the
likelihood is low that the perpetrator possesses the required information to
identify and modify the critical AC grid measurements in a large system.
As such, we assume that the perpetrator cannot introduce severe bias into
those measurements. Therefore, we assume that all measurements received
from the AC grid are uncorrupted and are those actually made. Under this
assumption, the errors in AC grid measurements arise from the usual causes,
such as thermal or electrical noises that result in normally distributed errors
with zero mean values. For the given objective of the study and the assump-
tions made about the threat model, we can make use of the injection-based
model of the combined AC-DC system. Not only does the injection-based
model reduce the computational complexity of power flow as well as state es-
timation, it also prevents gross errors in the HVDC subsystem measurements
from impacting the computation of the state estimate. We can formulate a
power system state-estimation-based approach to detect whether a power or-
der slated for implementation is corrupted. Specifically, we must have that
the approximate active power injections at the AC buses that are connected
to the HVDC subsystem, computed using the estimate of the state obtained
from the state estimation, be in close agreement to the power flow corre-
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sponding to the power order command transmitted for implementation. Any
significant deviation, even after accounting for measurement errors, latency in
communication and any other sources, is an indication that the transmitted
power order has either been incorrectly received or incorrectly implemented.
We refer to this proposed approach as the state-estimation-based approach
for cybersecurity threat detection in combined AC-DC systems.
For the approach to effectively detect cybersecurity threats rapidly, the
deviations between the approximate active power injections and the active
power injections corresponding to the true power order command transmit-
ted need to be closely monitored on a periodic basis with the appropriate
granularity. As the approximate injections are computed from the state es-
timation results, we require therefore that state estimation be performed on
a shorter period basis than the industry-wide 2-5 minute time interval. The
use of the WLS formulation of static system state estimation to track the
static system state of a power system as it varies with time has been proposed
before in [46], [49]. For large systems, the performance of state estimation
more frequently entails the receipt of more frequent system measurements.
Given the limitations on the amount of data that can be communicated over
the communication channel – the so-called throughput of the channel – and
on the ability to carry out contemporaneous measurements on the system,
some measurement prioritization scheme is required to help order the mea-
surements that are required to be received at the control center on a more
frequent basis to make the use of the proposed approach practical, particu-
larly for larger grids.
We propose an appropriate metric to use to prioritize the measurements
that must be received in real time. The needed measurements are the active
and reactive power flows of the lines, and the proposed metric for their pri-
oritization uses the set of power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) [50],
[51]. PTDFs are typically computed via linear approximations of the real
power flow equations. We use the PTDF definition given in [52]. The PTDF
of a line ` is the fraction of a given active power injection at bus i and its
withdrawal at bus j that flows on the line `. Specifically, the PTDF ϕi,j` of a
line ` for an active power injection ∆p at bus i and its withdrawal at bus j
is defined to be
ϕi,j` ,
∆f`
∆p
. (2.14)
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Here, ∆f` is the change in the active power flow on the line ` due to the
injection ∆p. A salient feature of PTDFs is that they are signed quantities
with magnitudes less than or equal to 1. A PTDF is sometimes expressed in
terms of a percentage, with its value describing the percentage change in the
active power flow of a line for the injection, with the sign determining the
direction of flow of that change. In all subsequent discussion in this report,
when we state a PTDF, we do so in percent.
Strictly speaking, PTDFs are defined as small signal sensitivities. In many
applications, however, they are also used to compute large signal quantities.
For example, the total active power flows in a system are often approximated
by
f = Φ(pG − pD). (2.15)
Here, f is the L-dimensional vector of active power line flows where L is the
total number of lines in the system, (pG−pD) is the (nb−1)-dimensional net
active power injection vector, and Φ is the PTDF matrix. PTDFs are a class
of distribution factors (DFs) widely used in power system contingency and
congestion studies. In our modified AC model, we represent active power into
and out of the DC subsystem in terms of injection and withdrawal terms at
the AC connection buses with the DC subsystem. The sending and receiving
end AC buses therefore serve as the buses i and j, respectively, for the injec-
tions and withdrawal ∆p in the PTDF definition. We can compute the PTDF
for every line in the modified AC model. We sort the PTDFs in decreasing
order of magnitude. Typically, the PTDFs of a large number of lines are very
close to 0 %, and only a small number of lines have PTDFs significantly larger
than 1 %. We therefore use the PTDFs to identify those lines for which we
associate high priority for the measurements in real time. This prioritization
results in a drastic reduction in the number of real-time measurements that
we need to receive to compute the static system state estimate. While this
prioritization scheme reduces the demands on the communication channels
for the amount of data that needs to be transmitted on a more frequent ba-
sis, a reduced measurement count prevents a solution to the state estimation
problem by making the system unobservable [53]. Thus, it becomes essential
to supplement the real-time measurements with additional information so
as to ensure observability. We ensure observability through the use of care-
fully specified pseudo-measurements. The concept of pseudo-measurements
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was first presented in state estimation in [47] and entails the deployment
of various data for supplemental information. Pseudo-measurements can in-
clude short-term load forecasts, known generation schedules and voltages.
For the more frequent state estimation we propose to use the most recent
state estimation result to create pseudo data for those lines from which mea-
surements are not received in real time for the subsequent state estimation.
These “measurements” are input into the state estimator at the current time
instant along with the real-time measurements received from the system.
These types of pseudo-measurements have been proposed earlier for use in
conjunction with limited PMU measurements to ensure observability in [54].
We have previously emphasized that the state-estimation-based approach
to cyber threat detection requires the computation of the state estimate more
frequently so as to be able to keep track of the system’s static state in time.
As the WLS state estimation is a nonlinear and non-convex problem (due
to the nonlinear and non-convex nature of the power flow equations), its
solution is an iterative and computationally expensive process as it involves
successive linearizations of the weighted residual function at every iteration.
For computational tractability reasons, we also place a limit on the number
of iterations allowed for every time instant at which the estimate of the state
is computed.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a review of the power flow and state estimation
problems in AC systems and their solution schemes. We also discussed the
proposed modeling and solution approaches for the extension of the solution
schemes for combined AC-DC systems. We outlined our modeling approach
to represent the interactions between the DC subsystems and AC subsys-
tems by a sequence of power injections and withdrawal snapshots at the AC
buses that connect to the DC subsystem. In this way, we can obtain an
AC modified system model for use in our cybersecurity studies of combined
AC-DC systems. We described the class of cyber threats that is the focus
of this report and laid out the state-estimation-based approach for their de-
tection. We provided details for the modifications we introduced to make
the approach practical for large grids on a more frequent basis. Specifically,
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we discussed the deployment of a metric for the identification of the high-
priority measurements that are required to be received in real time and the
introduction of a limit on the number of iterations in the state estimation to
ensure computational tractability. The state-estimation-based approach and
the modifications to make it practical for large grids are the key contributions
of this report.
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CHAPTER 3
SIMULATION SETUP AND
IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS
In chapter 2, we described in detail the proposed approach to detect cyber-
security threats in combined AC-DC systems. We have discussed the specific
class of cybersecurity threats that we consider – those that target the power
order commands of HVDC transmission lines. In this chapter, we describe
the simulation of a real-world combined AC-DC power system and its com-
munication between the HVDC line converter control center (CCS), inverter
control center (ICS), and the combined system EMS for the purposes of our
study. All the simulations for this study are carried out in software and we
describe the setup for the simulation of a real-world combined power system
and the collection and communication of system measurements to the EMS.
We describe this setup deployment to simulate operations at various operat-
ing points and perform the state estimation at each point. In this way, we
can perform the simulation at the different set points in a sequential manner
so as to emulate a ramp-up of the active power flow on the HVDC line over
a specified time period. We provide some insights into the computational
aspects of the implemented state estimation approach and on the advanta-
geous exploitation of sparsity to improve computational tractability. We also
describe the specific implementational aspects of sparsity exploitation that
we use in MATLAB.
3.1 Proposed software implementation
The basic idea of the proposed approach to cybersecurity threat detection is
to perform a consistency check between the active power injections computed
from the estimate of the state obtained from state estimation and the active
power injection corresponding to the true power flow transmitted for imple-
mentation. To test our proposed approach, we require a simulation setup
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that we can use to emulate the salient features of a power system that ap-
propriately represents combined AC-DC systems. Specifically, we construct
a simulation engine capable of emulating operations and state estimation of
an AC grid with an HVDC transmission line. The simulation engine is made
up of two components: a system operation emulator and a state estimation
module that is part of an EMS. The system operation emulator generates
the input data required for the state estimation module. The input data
to the state estimation module are system measurements that are collected
from the metered elements of the AC grid with the HVDC line. We con-
struct the EMS state estimation module using MATPOWER [55], a library
of free, open-source power system simulation, analysis and computation tools
written in MATLAB.
We use the PowerWorld Simulator software [56] as the basic building block
of the simulation engine. PowerWorld Simulator is a power flow software
package with the ability to compute power flows in AC networks with HVDC
systems using detailed combined AC-DC system models. For a set of input
power flow data, PowerWorld solves the power flow of the combined system to
determine the voltage magnitudes and angles at every AC bus in the system,
the active and reactive power flows for every line in the AC system, as well
as the variables of interest in the HVDC subsystem. We use PowerWorld to
solve the power flow of the combined system for a set of values of the DC
current Id on the HVDC transmission line, with all other system input data
remaining constant. The PowerWorld solutions indicate a set of static system
states of the combined system and the active power flows on the HVDC line
that correspond to each Id value. PowerWorld also outputs values of any
set of chosen measurements to external files that are read by the EMS state
estimation module.
We assume the DC current on the HVDC line is ramped up at a constant
ramp rate, from a minimum value Id to a maximum value Id. The constant
ramp rate assumption reflects the standard operational practice to reduce
electrical stresses and wear on the semiconductor modules in the converters.
We define a constant ramp rate R for the DC current and construct a set of
DC currents I with N evenly spaced values from Id to Id, resulting in a set
indexed by i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N . We construct a set of time indices T as
T = {ti : ti = ti−1 + ∆t, t0 = 0, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . N}, (3.1)
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where ∆t is the time interval between the successive time indices and is given
by
∆t =
∣∣∣∣∣Id − IdNR
∣∣∣∣∣ . (3.2)
As the ramp rate is assumed to be constant, all the time indices are equally
spaced. This gives us a set of time indices T = {t0, t1, t2, . . . , tN}. We
associate each time index ti ∈ T to a corresponding value of Idi ∈ I. We
solve the power flow for the combined system to obtain the static system
state and record the line flow measurements for each Id. The active and
reactive power line flows computed by PowerWorld become the inputs to
the state estimation module that determines the state of the system xˆ(ti) at
every time instant ti ∈ T . We compute the real power injections at the AC
buses connected to the sending and receiving end buses of the HVDC line
based on the state estimate at every ti ∈ T . Since for an uncorrupted power
order, the approximate injection, computed using the estimate of the state,
must conform – within a margin of error – to the specified power order value
implemented at every ti, a deviation indicates a power order that is either
incorrectly received or executed. As the simulation engine reproduces the
sequence of steady states through which the combined system passes, we do
not represent any dynamic behavior of the system. We depict the detection
scheme in Figure 3.1.
As the simulation setup computes the state estimates for the specified
sequence of time instants, we observe the errors between the approximate
injections and the results of the power flow solution corresponding to the
true power order across the full range of the power ramp. Specifically, we
attempt to gain insights in how the errors change as the maximum number
of iterations and the number of lines from which to receive measurements
in real-time vary. Such insights help us understand better how to determine
the appropriate number of iterations as well as the the number of lines from
which to prioritize measurements.
We note that the emulation process described in this section focuses on
simulating a ramp up in the active power on the HVDC line to generate data
to test our detection approach. However, the emulation process can also
be applied to emulate a ramp down in the active power flow, and the steps
involved in the detection approach remain unchanged.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of steps followed in the proposed approach.
3.2 Sparsity exploitation
The computational aspects of power system operations problems, such as
those in power flow, state estimation and optimal power flow, entail the so-
lution of large systems of linear equations on a repeated basis under a broad
range of parameter values for a large set of operating conditions. For effec-
tiveness in the operations environment, the solutions must be provided rather
rapidly. Therefore, solution methods must advantageously exploit inherent
structures or properties of such systems to the maximum extent possible.
The weakly meshed nature of power networks due to the fact that a bus
is connected to relatively few other buses results in highly sparse matrices.
Figure 3.2, for instance, shows the non-zero elements in the admittance ma-
26
trix of a 10,000-bus system. Special methods of storing such sparse matrices
Figure 3.2: Graphical depiction of the sparse structure of the admittance
matrix of a 10,000-bus system.
in computer memory allow for faster access to the elements within. Such
large sparse matrices are often saved in memory as tuples that consist of the
row and column indices only of the non-zero element and the corresponding
value of the non-zero element. The elements that are zero are not allocated
memory resources. For example, it is interesting to note in Figure 3.2 that
while the admittance matrix contains 108 complex-valued elements in total,
only 34,434 of those elements have non-zero real or imaginary part, resulting
in a 0.034 % percent fill. If only the non-zero elements are stored in mem-
ory, this requires approximately 885 KB of RAM. If all the elements of the
matrix are stored, however, it requires nearly 1.5 GB of RAM. Thus, the
memory allocation requirement increases by a factor of nearly 2000. This
increase in memory allocation also increases the number of read and write
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cycles, contributing to significant increases in total computation time. In
addition, several computational techniques, originally developed by Tinney
in [34] exploit the sparsity of the power network equations, several of which
depend on some method of reduction or triangularization of the matrices. In
the triangularization operation, pre-multiplication of the matrix of interest
by suitable permutation matrices preserves the sparsity of the triangular fac-
tor matrices, which reduces the computation time required in the subsequent
forward and backward substitution steps.
MATLAB is a high-level programming language with highly optimized
subroutines for mathematical operations of matrices, which are implemented
using libraries of lower-level programming languages. As our implementation
of the state estimator occurs at the high-level interface, it is optimal to
utilize the existing subroutines rather than to recreate their functionality in
customized new subroutines. We make use of these standard subroutines
extensively in our state estimator implementation. The storage class (full
or sparse) of the subroutine outputs are dependent on the storage class of
the subroutine inputs. Operations on full (sparse) matrices provide results
that are also full (sparse) matrices. Furthermore, once a matrix is defined
as sparse, all subsequent matrices obtained as a result of operations on that
matrix are also sparse. Therefore, to take advantage of the subroutines’
performance on sparse matrices, we initialize all necessary matrices as sparse
matrices. The non-zero real and imaginary elements of these matrices are
stored in one-dimensional arrays of double-precision reals, in column major
order. Another array of integers stores the row integers [57]. This format
of storage is referred to as compressed sparse column (CSC) storage. The
matrices initialized for storage in this format are the system branch and bus
admittance matrices, the covariance matrix in (A.2), as well as the block
matrix components of the Jacobian and gain matrices in (A.4) and (A.6),
respectively.
Additionally, while many MATLAB operators and subroutines can be
utilized to solve the linear system of the type described in (A.8), some
have performance advantages over others. Solving the linear system Ax=b
for x in MATLAB can be accomplished by inv(A)*b, linsolve(A, b),
mldivide(A, b) or A\b. Some of these methods are superior in terms of
performance due to checks performed on the properties of A. The \ operator,
in particular, performs checks on to determine whether A is square, triangu-
28
lar, Hermitian, upper Hessenberg or Cholesky decomposable, and dispatches
appropriate solvers accordingly [58]. Due to the inherent performance benefit
and flexibility obtained as a result of these checks, we solve the linear system
in (A.8) using the \ operator.
The explicit declaration of the covariance matrix, branch and bus admit-
tance matrices, and block matrix components of the Jacobian and gain ma-
trices as sparse storage class structures, and the use of the appropriate solver
subroutines and operators form the crux of our implementation of sparsity
storage and computation techniques.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the details of our simulation aspects and
provided a constructional description for the simulation engine. The specific
software tools that are used for the components of the simulation engine are
described. The means to simulate the ramp of the real power flow on a HVDC
line for a combined AC-DC system is described. We devoted a section to
discuss the need to exploit sparsity patterns to reduce computational time.
The specific steps that we implement in the MATLAB implementation of
state estimation are described. Specifically, the explicit initialization of the
large matrices in the computation process as well as the appropriate choice
of operators and subroutines for solving the large system of linear equation
involved in state estimation are discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
NUMERICAL STUDY RESULTS
We devote this chapter to discuss in depth representative numerical study
results of the application of the state-estimation-based detection approach
to detect a data integrity attack directed at the power order command on an
HVDC line in a large, combined AC-DC bulk test system. In this chapter,
we illustrate the use of the state-estimation-based approach developed in
chapter 2 to detect a power order threat in a realistic combined AC-DC bulk
test system implemented in the setup described in chapter 3. The test system
we use is a reduced version of a 10,000-bus synthetic AC test system that
was created to represent the U.S. part of the WECC system. We construct
a modified version of this test system that we obtain by the addition of an
HVDC line to represent the Pacific DC intertie from Northern Oregon to
Southern California. In this way, we obtain the AC-DC test system that
we use in the studies discussed in this chapter. The complete details of
test system and the modifications made to it are described in Appendix
A. In these studies, we simulate an adversary modified power order of the
HVDC line in the test system and examine the effectiveness of the state-
estimation-based approach to detect such an attack. The numerical studies
presented in this chapter effectively illustrate the capability of the proposed
fast, approximate state estimation scheme to track a large system’s state
over time using a reduced measurement set and with a limit on the number
of iterations in the estimation process. We describe the heuristic procedures
we adopt for the selection of the appropriate values of the tunable parameters
in the detection approach. We also provide sensitivity analysis results on the
performance of the approach to changes in the tunable parameter values. The
numerical results indicate that the proposed approach bounds the extent to
which a cyber threat perpetrator can corrupt a power order implementation
and evade detection. The insights we gain from the numerical results from
the sensitivity study analysis provide the demonstrated performance of the
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proposed approach on the large test system. As such, its application to
actual real-world combined AC-DC systems is appropriate for the detection
of power order commands on HVDC lines and other data integrity threats.
4.1 Overview of the numerical studies
The focus of the application studies reported here is on the application of the
state-estimation-based detection approach to a data integrity threat in the
selected large-scale test system. We obtained information that the Pacific
DC intertie current can ramp up from 0 to 6,200 A over a 20-minute time
interval (Brian Johnson, University of Idaho, personal communication, March
19, 2019). As the DC voltage at the receiving end of the HVDC line remains
constant at 500 kV, the 0 - 6,200 A increase in the current implies an increase
in the active power withdrawal at the receiving end bus from 0 - 3,100 MW.
The sending end active power injection is higher than the receiving end active
power withdrawal to cover the losses incurred on the HVDC line. We define
the collection of sampling time instants of the 20-minute current ramp up
period in seconds as the set
T = {0, 15, 30, . . . , 1200}. (4.1)
The time instants ti are indexed by i, where i = 0, 1, . . . , 80. The time
interval ∆t is defined as the time difference between any two successive ti+1
and ti in the set T . For each sampling time instant ti in T , we compute the
current on the HVDC line Id, and solve the power flow of the combined AC-
DC system at each of these Id values. For the studies discussed, we simulate
the implementation of a corrupted power order by specifying an index i1
that corresponds to a sampled time instant ti1 at which the corrupted power
order order initiates the power flow, and another index i2 which corresponds
to time instant ti2 when the corrupted power order completes its ramp up.
The active and reactive power line flows for the AC lines in the system,
computed from the power flow solutions, are stored for use as measurement
inputs into the state estimation scheme. The active power withdrawal at the
receiving end bus of the HVDC line that corresponds to the true power order
command transmitted at each ti serves as the reference basis against which
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the approximate withdrawals, computed using the estimate of the state at
time ti, are compared. The numerical results presented in this chapter are
for a true power order that ramps the current Id on the line from 1,240 A to
3,100 A. This implies that the true power withdrawal at the receiving send
bus ramps up from 620 MW at time t32 = 480 s to 1,550 MW at t40 = 600
s. The corrupted power order modifies the final value of Id of the true power
order to 4,960 A, resulting in the final value of the active power withdrawal
at the receiving end bus to be 2,480 MW. This ramp of the corrupted power
order finishes implementation at t64 = 960 s.
We focus on the deployment of the detection approach at the receiving end
bus. At a sampling time instant ti, we denote with pr(ti) the active power
withdrawal at the receiving end bus which corresponds to the true power or-
der transmitted for implementation. We denote with pˆr(ti) the approximate
active power withdrawal at the receiving end bus, computed by the power
flow engine based on the estimated states at ti. The computation requires the
evaluation of the active power balance equation given in (2.2) corresponding
to the estimated state vector xˆ(ti) produced by the state estimation of the
approach. We define the receiving end active power withdrawal error as
r(ti) , pˆr(ti)− pr(ti). (4.2)
The state-estimation-based detection approach involves the evaluation of the
magnitude of the receiving end active power withdrawal error and checking
that it is less than the specified receiving end error tolerance r. Mathemat-
ically, we write the detection approach as performing the consistency check
|r(ti)| < r, ti ∈ T . (4.3)
If this condition is violated at a time instant ti, then it is an indication that
a corrupted version of the true power order command is being implemented.
For detection purposes, r is a tunable parameter. Ideally, a sufficiently small
value of r must be specified for detection to be considered effective. How-
ever, the selection of a value of r that is too low may produce false positive
detection results, because the accuracy of the approximate state estimation
scheme, and consequently that of the approximate active power withdrawal,
is affected by the choice of the scheme’s tunable parameters of the PTDF
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magnitude threshold ϕ and the maximum number of iterations k. In other
words, there is an interdependence among the three parameters r, ϕ and
k. We independently specify the tunable parameters ϕ and k for the state
estimation process and, given the interdependence, the determination of an
appropriate value of r is dependent on the specified values of ϕ and k. Due
to the nonlinearities in the AC WLS state estimation formulation, no ana-
lytical guarantees can be derived for the accuracy of the approximate state
estimation scheme, and, hence, that of the approximate active power with-
drawal, for a set of specified values of ϕ and k. As such, the heuristic nature
of the procedure to select the appropriate value of the tunable parameters
requires considerable testing over a wide range of conditions for each grid.
In other words, there is more “art” than a solid analytic basis to guide the
parameter specifications. The key thrust of the testing is to determine the
appropriate values of ϕ and k for a specific system that results in the lowest
value of r, so as to provide the lowest possible latency without false positives
in the detection of corrupted power order commands on that system.
For a pair of specified values of ϕ and k in the state estimation scheme, we
adopt the following heuristic procedure to choose the associated appropriate
value of the parameter r. We simulate the implementation of an uncorrupted
power order that ramps the HVDC line current Id from 0 to 6,200 A over the
time period covered by the set T . The state-estimation-based scheme with
the specified ϕ and k values allows the evaluation of the approximate receiv-
ing end active power withdrawal error for every ti ∈ T and the definition of
the associated receiving end error tolerance r
r , max{|r(ti)|}. (4.4)
We illustrate this interplay among the three tunable parameters of the de-
tection approach through the simulation of the implementation of the cor-
rupted power order discussed above. The analysis of the sensitivity study
results provides insights into the effective deployment into the selection of
the three parameter values and the associated ramifications of the selection
on the performance of the detection approach. Such insights provide a sys-
tematic approach for a system operator or other decision maker to apply the
state-estimation-based detection scheme to a particular system.
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4.2 The study results
We present here the results of the state-estimation-based detection scheme
in the tracking of the approximated withdrawal at the receiving end bus of
the test system for the corrupted power order described in section 4.1. We
compute the approximations of the withdrawals using a value of ϕ = 9 %
and k = 5 in the calculations of the detection scheme. We display the plot
of the detection results in Figure 4.1. We discuss the justification of the
selected parameter values below but first we present the numerical results of
the sensitivity analysis. In Figure 4.1, we display the performance plot of
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the results between the withdrawal
approximation based on state estimate outcome and the power flow
withdrawal for the true order for the example of the corrupted order that
modifies the true power order to ramp up to 2,480 MW.
the state estimator to track the approximated withdrawals as the corrupted
power order is implemented. The chosen value of ϕ = 9 % results in a total
of 56 prioritized lines used in the state estimation estimation procedure. We
note here that the approximate withdrawal pˆr(ti) displays some asymptotic
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behavior under static, steady state conditions, as indicated for all ti < 480
s (8 min) shown in the inset in Figure 4.1. We display in Figure 4.2 the
magnitude of the error r(ti) for the corrupted power order tracked in Figure
4.1. We note that in Figure 4.2 as pˆr(ti) begins to deviate significantly from
Figure 4.2: The receiving end withdrawal error magnitude for the corrupted
power order implementation illustrated in Figure 4.1.
pr(ti) after ti > 600s (10 min) – the time instant at which the ramp of the
true power order was scheduled to have completed implementation – |r(ti)|
begins to grow very rapidly. Clearly, the choice of r determines the instant
at which the detection is successful to indicate an abnormal situation. For
example, a choice of r = 200 MW, means that the error tolerance is violated
at ti = 690 s (11.5 min) – 90 s (1.5 min) after the ramp of the true power order
must have completed implementation. Such a choice of r leads to a relatively
high latency in the detection of the corruption of the power order command.
However, the choice of a low value of r, say 15 MW, leads to a false positive
result, as can be seen from the inset in Figure 4.2. We select a value of r
= 39 MW and apply it to the plot of |r(ti)| in Figure 4.2. The consistency
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check condition (4.3) is violated at t42 = 630 s (10.5 min), 30 seconds after
the true power order was scheduled to complete implementation.
For the determination of the appropriate value of r = 39 MW, we simulate
the implementation of the uncorrupted power order that ramps Id from 0
A to 6,200 A, which implies a 0 - 3,100 MW increase in the active power
withdrawal at the receiving end bus of the 500-kV DC line. This uncorrupted
power order is tracked by the state estimation scheme using the identical
values of ϕ = 9 % and k = 5. The comparison between pˆr(ti) and pr(ti) for
this uncorrupted power order is shown in Figure 4.3. The plot of |r(ti)| for
Figure 4.3: Comparison of the results between the withdrawal
approximation based on state estimate outcome and the power flow
withdrawal for a current ramp on the HVDC line from 0 A to 6,200 A.
this uncorrupted power order is shown in Figure 4.4. We note that |r(ti)|
varies from approximately 24 MW to 39 MW. As this is the range of |r(ti)|
in the tracking of the receiving end bus withdrawals for a full ramp on the
HVDC line with the specified values of ϕ and k, the choice of a value of r
below the maximum value of |r(ti)| results in a false positive result. As such,
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Figure 4.4: The receiving end withdrawal error magnitude for the
uncorrupted power order implementation illustrated in Figure 4.3.
our selected value of r is 39 MW to avoid any false positive outcomes. This
lower bound choice for r may result in instances for a corrupted power order
command at which the corrupted command error tolerance is not violated
and so in failure to detect the corruption attempt. The ramifications of our
selected value of r = 39 MW in the application of the state-estimation-based
detection approach are on the extent to which a cyber attacker may corrupt
a power order command and evade detection.
The choice of ϕ = 9 % and k = 5 is based on the analysis done on the state
estimation scheme sensitivity studies. For the purposes of our discussion here,
we use the example of the simulation of the implementation of uncorrupted
power order commands that ramp Id from 0 to 6,200 A for many different
values of the parameters ϕ and k, and compute r for each combination of
ϕ and k selected. The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 4.5,
as a plot of constant value r contours for the combination of selected ϕ and
k values, where the horizontal and vertical axes are the selected values of ϕ
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and k. Each contour displays the set of combinations of ϕ and k that result
in errors whose magnitudes do not exceed the specified r over the 20-minute
simulation. The value of r for each combination of ϕ and k is shown in the
plot. The contours demarcate the regions in which r lies within the range
indicated by the legend above the plot. Areas of the plot where the contours
are very close together indicate large changes in r. The contour lines can
also be used to assess the sensitivity of r to changes in ϕ or k. For any
specified value of ϕ, we obtain the sensitivity of r to k by observation of the
changes in the values of r as k changes. Similarly, for a specified value of k,
we obtain the sensitivity of r to ϕ by observation of the changes in the values
of r as ϕ changes. Figure 4.5 indicates that the value of r is more sensitive
to changes in PTDF magnitude threshold than maximum iterations. For this
test system and this power order command simulation, we note that there
is a large increase in the value of r for PTDF magnitude threshold values
over 19 %, increasing from 43 MW at 19 % to 202 MW at 23 %, for values
of k > 2. For k > 2, we see that there are regions of low sensitivity of r to
PTDF magnitude threshold in the ranges 6 % - 9 % and 10 % - 19 %, with
the range of 6 % - 9 % characterized by the lowest r results. We note also
that for any specified value of ϕ, the sensitivity of r to k is negligible for
k > 2, as the value of r does not change. While the figure indicates that k =
1 generally results in the lowest values of r, we refrain from using it as it lies
in a region where the norm of the weighted residues in the state estimation
(computed using (A.8)) is high. The changes in the norm of the weighted
residues for the first three iterations are also relatively large, showing orders
of magnitude changes between successive iterations. We choose a value of
k = 5 as this results in the state estimation scheme where the subsequent
changes in the weighted residues do not change significantly.
So far, we have discussed the numerical study results that describe the
performance of the state-estimation-based detection approach to track the
approximated withdrawals over time for a corrupted power order in our se-
lected test system. We have also discussed the procedure we use to select the
tunable parameter values. The results of extensive testing that characterize
the changes in r due to changes in ϕ and k are also presented and discussed.
In the following section, we focus our discussion on the key insights that we
obtain from the numerical studies, and the factors to consider to as we apply
the proposed approach to other test systems.
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4.3 Key findings from the studies
The approach to cyber threat detection in combined AC-DC bulk systems
and the study results applied to a large-scale test system provide some very
useful insights into the capability of the proposed state-estimation-based ap-
proach to detect data integrity attacks directed at power order commands.
The numerical studies of the application of the fast, approximate state-
estimation-based scheme to the selected test system show that the prioritiza-
tion to a very small subset of the real-time measurements makes it possible to
track the implementation of a power order command with reasonably good
accuracy and thereby detect the implementation of a corrupted power order
command with acceptably low latency. We examine the trade-offs involved
in chosen values of the tunable parameters in the detection approach. From
the extensive testing results that we collected, we are able to show that the
judicious choice of the tunable parameters allows us to detect the corruption
of a power order command within a 5 % error magnitude bound of its true
value within the initial 30 s period via the use of the measurements from just
56 prioritized lines out of the nearly 5,400 lines. In essence, the proposed
approach provides a MW-bound on the extent to which an attacker can cor-
rupt a power order command and evade detection. For our test system, in
the studies performed, an attacker cannot corrupt a power order command
by more than a 39-MW deviation from its true value as any larger magnitude
deviation is detected. Such extensive testing to determine the appropriate
choice of tunable parameters is totally necessary due to the nonlinear na-
ture of the AC state estimation formulation, which precludes the setup of an
analytical basis for the selection of the tunable parameter values.
From our results of the investigation of the sensitivity of the withdrawal
approximations to changes in the tunable parameters ϕ and k, we find that
the value of r undergoes large changes for small changes in the value of ϕ
but is not perturbed even by larger changes in k. The greater sensitivity
of r to ϕ is due to the fact that the PTDF magnitude threshold influences
how much of the available contemporaneous system information – the real-
time measurements – is used in the state estimation scheme at every time
instant. The use of a reduced number of real-time measurements requires
the provision of a larger set of pseudo-measurements to replace the discarded
real-time measurements in the state estimation scheme. However, such a
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replacement reduces the accuracy of state estimation results and leads to
larger errors in the computed active power withdrawal approximation.
In the attempt to reduce computing times of the proposed approach, we
were able to gain serious improvements from the advantageous exploitation
of sparsity in the state estimation scheme described in the discussion of the
implementational aspects of the proposed approach in section 3.2. Due to
the use of sparse storage and computation techniques in our implementa-
tion of the state estimation scheme, each iteration of the state estimation
computation is performed in circa 0.05 seconds. However, without sparsity
exploitation, each iteration of the state estimation computation would require
nearly 240 seconds. As such, the 16-fold reduction in the computational ef-
fort ensures that the tracking of the system state on a 15 s-basis is easily
accomplished. This sparsity exploitation is therefore essential for the ability
of the proposed approach for applications to even larger combined AC-DC
systems than that of the test system used in our studies.
The numerical results presented have focused on the application of the
detection approach at the receiving end bus of the HVDC line to protect
against corrupted power command attempts. The approach may be equally
applicable at the sending end bus of the HVDC line after an analogous test-
ing procedure for the selection of the tunable parameters is performed. The
state-estimation-based approach and the heuristic procedures we have out-
lined for the selection of the appropriate values of the tunable parameters
have sufficient generality to allow their adoption to other combined AC-DC
systems with multiple HVDC lines. We also note that in our test system, a
slightly higher latency may be accommodated under the choice of a larger
value of the tunable parameter r – 43 MW – in the detection approach with
a corresponding increase in the PTDF magnitude threshold ϕ to 19 %, which
would further reduce the number of prioritized lines from 56 to 24. For the
test system used in this study, the number of the prioritized AC lines depends
strongly on the specified PTDF magnitude threshold. The plot in Figure 4.6
indicates the reduction of the 5,400 lines of the AC system as a function of ϕ.
In terms of implementation of the approach in an actual, large-scale system,
such a reduction in the use of the measurements and the resultant subset of
prioritized lines can translate into a reduction in the cost of the implementa-
tion of the scheme as the communication channels of fewer metered devices
would have to be upgraded. The implementation of the approach in real,
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot of the number of prioritized lines as a function of
the specified ϕ value.
large-scale systems can involve cost-benefit analysis studies to determine the
relative trade-offs in the choice of the tunable parameters.
The study results show that estimates of the system state of higher trust-
worthiness for a system may be obtained via upgrades of the communication
channels of only those lines that are elements of the reduced subset of lines
as a result of the specified ϕ value. In doing so, the state-estimation-based
approach is made more capable to provide protection against cyber attacks
without upgrades of the communication channels for all the lines in the sys-
tem. The communication channel upgrades for better protection against
cyber attacks may be accomplished in a few different ways. The lines that
have been identified as prioritized based on their PTDF magnitude values
need to have their communication channels upgraded to end-to-end encryp-
tion. Communication channels that transmit measurements can also better
protect against cyber attacks via the deployment of fiber-optic-based com-
munication hardware.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented the use of the state-estimation-based approach
to cyber threat detection in a large-scale combined AC-DC combined sys-
tem. We illustrated the use of the approach to track the implementation of
a corrupted power order command in such a test system. We presented rep-
resentative numerical results on the performance of the proposed approach
to track the implementation of a corrupted power order command making
effective use of a reduced subset of measurements. We presented the heuristic
procedures used to select the appropriate values for the tunable parameters
in the detection approach. The prioritization of the use of measurements
to those lines whose PTDF value magnitude is above a specified ϕ results
in a marked reduction to less than 2 % of the total number of AC lines in
the test AC-DC system. Our tests were successful in the detection of the
implementation of the corrupted power order command to within 5 % of its
true value within a time period of 30 s. We provided useful insights obtained
from the sensitivity studies that we performed for use in the adaptation of
the proposed scheme to actual large-scale grids. The approach we described
is practical for application to large-scale grids with multiple HVDC lines.
43
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we summarize the key contributions and the results of the
studies presented in this report. We also suggest possible directions for future
research.
5.1 Review of the contributions and performed studies
In this work, we present a practical, general, and flexible state-estimation-
based approach for the detection of data integrity attacks directed at power
order commands on the HVDC lines in combined AC-DC bulk grids. The mo-
tivation behind the development of the approach lies in the need to safeguard
the cybersecurity of such systems. The attacks arise from the increasing de-
ployment of cyberphysical devices in modern power systems to improve the
situational awareness and to reduce response times in case of contingencies.
The approach we propose relies on the performance of consistency checks
based on the differences between the power injections computed from the es-
timates of the state and the injections associated with the true power order
command that is entered for implementation. To ensure that the detection
approach has a low latency, we make use of certain approximation techniques
in the state-estimation-based scheme to make it computationally tractable
within the limited time budgets such a detection must be performed. These
approximation techniques involve the prioritization of system measurements
used to a small subset of lines of the AC subsystem and a limit on the max-
imum number of iterations on the state estimation computation. The crite-
rion to include a line in the selected subset is based on the PTDF magnitude
to the injections of interest. We discussed representative numerical results
obtained from the simulation studies run to investigate the capabilities of
the approach to detect a corrupted power order command for a realistic-size
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combined AC-DC bulk grid test system.
We described in detail the important insights gained into the performance
of the approach in the detection of corrupted power order commands on
the DC subsystem of a combined AC-DC bulk grid. We find that by the
prioritization-based reduction of the total system measurements to a very
small number, the injection approximations can be computed with accept-
able accuracy to detect corrupted power order commands over sub-minute
intervals. A key observation is that the heuristic procedure to select the ap-
propriate values of the tunable parameters in the detection approach requires
extensive testing for a given system. Sensitivity studies form an important
part of this heuristic selection procedure for the selection of the parame-
ter values as these studies help considerably to determine the appropriate
choices. The judicious selection of the tunable parameters of the detection
approach allows us to bound the extent to which a cyber threat perpetra-
tor may corrupt a power order command so as to evade detection. In our
numerical results, we showed that we were able to detect the corruption of
a 920 MW power order command to within 5 % of its true value within a
30-second period by the prioritization of measurements from less than 2 %
of the approximately 5,400 lines in the test system.
The discussion of the analyzed results sheds light on the beneficial im-
pacts of modifications to parts of the communication network. Specifically,
from an implementation standpoint, the upgrade of the communication chan-
nels used for the prioritized line measurements provides the system operator
with effective means to closely track the system state over time with an en-
hanced level of trustworthiness. The performance of the proposed approach
on a wide range of sensitivity studies provides the basis to conclude that
the approach can be applied to large-scale combined AC-DC grids to detect
corrupted power order commands. More generally, the approach is extend-
able to detect more general data integrity threats with demonstrated rapid
response times. Moreover, the proposed approach is general in the sense
that it can be adapted for use in combined AC-DC bulk grids with multiple
HVDC lines. A significant aspect of our approach lies in its ability to pro-
vide answers to a great variety of “what if” questions on detection tolerances
and response times under a wide range of conditions. The application of the
proposed approach to specific systems can advantageously exploit its flexi-
bility in the determination of the tunable parameter values with the explicit
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representation of the system’s operating strategies. The work thus repre-
sents an advancement of the state of the art in detection of data integrity
attacks on power order commands in combined AC-DC grids, as it presents a
comprehensive approach that is general, practical to implement and provides
the ability to make appropriate choices in the trade-offs between detection
latency and the selected tunable parameter values.
5.2 Directions for future research
An important direction for future work is to investigate the application of the
approach to other power systems with multiple HVDC lines and examine the
effectiveness in the detection scheme over a broad range of sensitivity cases.
Some modifications may be required in such applications to gain additional
insights into the limits of the effectiveness of the approach, if any. To reflect
the realities of the cyber-physical systems in terms of communication latency
with improved fidelity and asynchronous measurement acquisition through
SCADA protocols such as DNP3, the implementation of the approach in a
hardware-in-loop (HIL)-based real-time simulation (RTS) environment, such
as OPAL-RT, may be a highly beneficial contribution. Future investigations
and modifications to the proposed approach may also involve relaxation of
certain assumptions about the AC network made in the models used in the
studies of this report. For example, sensitivity studies to the effectiveness
of the detection approach to changes in network topology, as well to allow
for limited false data injection in the AC system measurements. The incor-
poration of bad data detection in the AC state estimation and the use of
probabilistic anomaly detection methods for threat detection are also poten-
tial topics for future research. Some analytical quantification of the detection
thresholds under the use of measurement prioritization may be possible if al-
ternate state estimation formulations – linear estimators, for example – are
used, and such investigations in the future may prove fruitful.
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APPENDIX A
REVIEW OF STATE ESTIMATION
We review the mathematical formulation of the nonlinear AC state estimator
for the convenience of the reader. The formulation follows closely along the
lines described by Abur and Expo´sito in [59]. For a set of m measurements
used to estimate the n states, with m >> n, we express the relation between
the m-dimensional vector of measurements z and the n-dimensional vector
of the system states x by the expression
z = h(x) + e. (A.1)
Here, h(·) : Rn → Rm is the nonlinear function that relates the noisy mea-
surements z ∈ Rm to the vector of states x ∈ Rn. The assumptions made
for the measurement errors are:
• The expected value of the error is 0, i.e., E(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
• The measurement errors are independent of one another, i.e., E[eiej] =
0, and consequently, cov(e) = E[e · e>] = R = diag{σ21, σ22, · · · , σ2m}.
Here, σi is the standard deviation of the i-th measurement, which reflects the
accuracy of the corresponding meter used for the measurement. The WLS
estimator minimizes the objective function:
J(x) = [z − h(x)]>R−1[z − h(x)], (A.2)
which may be rewritten as a scalar quantity
J(x) =
m∑
i=1
(zi − hi(x))2
σ2i
. (A.3)
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At the minimum of J(·), the first-order optimality condition requires that
g(x) =
∂J(x)
∂x
= −H(x)>R−1[z − h(x)] = 0, (A.4)
where, H(x) =
[
∂h(x)
∂x
]
. We rewrite g(·) in terms of its first order Taylor
series expansion around the state vector at a specified value xk to be
g(x) ≈ g(xk) +G(xk)(x− xk) = 0, (A.5)
where, G(x) =
[
∂g(x)
∂x
]
. From (A.4), we rewrite G(xk) as
G(xk) =
∂g(xk)
∂x
=
∂2J(xk)
∂x2
= H(xk)>R−1H(xk). (A.6)
We substitute (A.6) into (A.5) and obtain
g(xk) +H(xk)>R−1H(xk)(x− xk) = 0. (A.7)
Upon the substitution of (A.4) into (A.7), we have that
H(xk)>R−1H(xk)(x− xk) = H(xk)>R−1[z − h(xk)].
The above equation may be solved iteratively, in the form
G(xk)(∆xk+1) = H(xk)>R−1[z − h(xk)], (A.8)
where
∆xk+1 = xk+1 − xk, (A.9)
and k is the iteration index. Equations (A.8) and (A.9) are referred to as
the normal equations, and the matrix G(x) is often referred to as the gain
matrix [59]. The right-hand side product of (A.8) is also referred to as the
residual matrix. The elements of the residual matrix are often used to detect
bad data.
In this report, the measurements we use are the active and reactive power
flows at the sending and receiving ends of each AC line. For a power network
that consists of L lines, we define the function h(x) as the 4L-dimensional
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vector
h(x) =

ps(x)
qs(x)
pr(x)
qr(x)
 .
Here, the L-dimensional vectors of functions ps(·) and qs(·) (pr(·) and qr(·))
express the line active and reactive power flows at the sending (receiving)
end of the L lines, respectively. In terms of our definition of the system state
vector x in (2.1) as
x =
[
θ
v
]
, (A.10)
the block structure of the Jacobian H(x) may be stated as
H(x) =

H11 H12
H21 H22
H31 H32
H41 H42
 , (A.11)
with the block sub-matrices defined by the partial derivatives
H11 =
∂ps(x)
∂θ
H12 =
∂ps(x)
∂v
H21 =
∂qs(x)
∂θ
H22 =
∂qs(x)
∂v
H31 =
∂pr(x)
∂θ
H32 =
∂pr(x)
∂v
H31 =
∂qr(x)
∂θ
H32 =
∂qr(x)
∂v
.
(A.12)
The efficient matrix notation expressions that we use to compute the above
partial derivatives are given in [60], pp. 6–13.
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APPENDIX B
THE SYNTHETIC WECC TEST SYSTEM
We describe here the synthetic test system that we use in the case studies in
the report and describe its salient features. We also indicate the modifications
introduced to meet the objective of the studies we undertook.
The test system we choose is a synthetic one based on the U.S. part of
the Western Interconnection, the so-called Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC) grid. The WECC system is a combined AC-DC system
with several HVDC transmission lines. The Pacific DC intertie is one such
HVDC transmission line. It connects the Celilo converter substation situated
in the power-producing region of the Pacific Northwest near the Oregon-
Washington border with the Sylmar inverter substation situated in the power-
consuming region of the Los Angeles area in Southern California.
We use a 10,000-bus synthetic AC model of the WECC system maintained
by the Electric Grid Test Case Repository, available online at [61]. This
synthetic system was created based on the approach laid out in [62], with
case file formats available for use in a variety of power system simulation
software packages, including Power Simulator, MATPOWER, and PSS/E.
Figure B.1 shows the one-line diagram of the U.S. part of the 10,000-bus
synthetic power system over its geographic footprint. We modify this syn-
thetic power system model with the addition of the HVDC transmission line
between the Celilo and Sylmar buses in the synthetic system with a capacity
of 6,200 A, to represent the Pacific DC intertie. The real Pacific DC intertie
is physically connected to the WECC AC grid at AC buses rated at 230 kV.
As such, we construct a reduced version of the synthetic 10,000-bus system
that retains the buses and transmission lines of voltage at levels of 230 kV
and above. This reduced model allows us to focus on the bulk transmis-
sion grid. The model reduction is done in PowerWorld Simulator. Table
B.1 lists the system characteristics for the synthetic network as well as the
reduced version which we used in our studies. We model the sending end
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Table B.1: Comparison of the original and reduced network
feature synthetic network reduced network
number of buses 10,000 2,470
number of lines 12,706 5,375
converter as a voltage-controlled converter and the receiving end converter
as a current-controlled inverter. The voltage control on the sending end con-
verter adjusts the sending end voltage via the tuning of the thyristor firing
angles and transformer taps to ensure that the specified current flows on the
HVDC line. The current control at the receiving end inverter adjusts the
thyristor firing and extinction angles to ensure that the DC voltage is held
at the specified value of 500 kV. In terms of active power flow, the 0 - 6,100
A range of the current value implies an active power withdrawal range of 0
- 3,100 MW at the receiving end. The sending end active power injection is
higher to account for losses incurred on the HVDC line. The sending end
active power ranges from 0 MW to approximately 3,465 MW. The network
details of the reduced synthetic test system are available online at [63].
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